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Chapter 5- Sectoral Views on Brexit and Future UK-EU Relations 
 
Having discussed the current internal security relationship between the EU and the 
UK, the consequences of Brexit for both actors, the emerging negotiation positions, 
and the political and legal challenges to future cooperation, the following three 
chapters offer a diverse range of detailed accounts on the different challenges ahead, 
authored by some of the main academics in the field.  
 
The first chapter of sectoral views focuses on Brexit and the future relations between 
the UK and the EU. In the opening contribution, Fichera summarises the potential 
impact of Brexit on the future development of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, as well as the consequences for the UK on the basis of its future 
decreased participation in police and judicial cooperation, and on migration, asylum, 
and borders legislation. Ripoll-Servent discusses these consequences further by 
showing the UK’s deep involvement in the AFSJ through multiple instruments, 
institutions, and agencies, and by alerting us to the loss of expertise that these 
platforms will experience as a result of Brexit. She also underlines that Brexit could 
lead to growing differentiation and complexity in the AFSJ, rather than harmonisation. 
Mortera-Martinez provides a realistic view of the limitations of a potential EU-UK 
security agreement and how these might impact on the future UK-EU relationship. 
She does this by analysing the negotiation preferences of both parties, as well as the 
policy options on the table, looking specifically at extradition, access to law 
enforcement databases and partnerships with EU agencies. The final contribution in 
this chapter, by Fahey, reflects upon transatlantic relations and how they inform 
future UK-EU relations, specifically in regards to external/internal security, the 
exposure of a lack of transparency in transatlantic relations, the possibility for the UK 
to replicate EU-US agreements, the importing of international norms, and the UK 
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The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is a complex set of policies and 
legislation including key areas of cooperation, such as data protection, exchange of 
information and criminal justice. The participation of the UK in the AFSJ has always 
been characterised by a high degree of complexity. It should be borne in mind that, 
following the end of the transitional period pursuant to Protocol 36 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the provisions of what was once the Third Pillar ceased to apply to the UK, as 
of 1 December 2014. However, the UK has confirmed the applicability of 35 
measures, mostly in the field of mutual recognition in criminal matters and legislation 
on Europol and Eurojust. Once Brexit has officially begun, even this piecemeal 
approach might be changed and this might add further complexity to the relationship 
between the UK and the EU. 
 
The consequences of Brexit on the development of the AFSJ may be of different 
nature and concern both the EU and the UK.  
 
Concerning the EU, on the one hand, Brexit might increase the level of differentiated 
integration, especially in the field of police and judicial cooperation and immigration 
and asylum. Not only the coherence of AFSJ, but also the principle of legal certainty 
may be affected, in so far as the UK would participate in mutual recognition measures, 
as it has done so far, but not in measures on the protection of the procedural rights of 
the defence (e.g. participating in the Framework Decision on the EAW, but not in the 
Directive on Access to a Lawyer). On the other hand, deeper integration in the EU 
might be facilitated in some areas of police and judicial cooperation and immigration 
and asylum, e.g. in terms of a move away from mutual recognition towards 
harmonisation of substantive criminal law or the strengthening of the European Public 
Prosecutor Office, and a move away from a resettlement towards a relocation 
approach in the field of immigration and asylum.  At the same time, the effectiveness 
and level of cooperation between EU agencies and bodies might also be affected: for 
example, as regards data collection and retention. One important aspect could be the 
fate of data and information that have already been exchanged, or the question of how 
the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the AFSJ should be 
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treated starting from the date of Brexit. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that 
AFSJ, free movement and citizenship rules are strictly connected, so that the 
negotiations concerning the latter field inevitably affect the former. For example, one 
issue could be how the "past conduct" of citizens who might be expelled from the 
country on grounds of public policy or public security might be judged if it covers 
events both preceding and following Brexit. 
 
Concerning the UK, following Brexit, future governments risk being excluded from 
several components of the network of judicial and police cooperation, such as the 
exchange of criminal records and the establishment of joint investigation teams. In 
addition, the effectiveness of the activities of UK investigation and prosecution 
authorities might be undermined and the UK might end up being affected by measures 
in the field of AFSJ without being directly capable of participating in the development 
of AFSJ. The EU will also lose the UK's expertise and input in AFSJ policy-making.  
 
Finally, the UK currently only participates in part of the immigration, asylum and 
borders legislation, as regards the Common European Asylum System, the Dublin 
Regulation and a few directives on minimum standards for the asylum system. As a 
result of Brexit, there is a danger that, first of all, the above standards will no longer 
be respected; and, second, that exchange of information is compromised. The same is 
true of Eurodac, a biometric database including fingerprints of asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants. 
 
The UK government seems to be at least in part aware of the shortcomings associated 
with Brexit. As indicated in the HM Government Technical Note on Security, Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice (May 2018), “a piecemeal approach to future 
cooperation, drawing on precedents for EU agreements with third countries on 
individual measures (e.g. Europol) or functions (e.g. extradition) would result in a 
limited patchwork of cooperation falling well short of current capabilities and not 
deliver our shared objectives” (p. 1). Hence the proposal of a more comprehensive 
UK-EU Internal Security Treaty, possibly negotiated on the basis of Article 218 
TFEU. Cooperation would be promoted via three pillars: internal security, external 
security and wider cooperation. However, it is not yet entirely clear what areas this 
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new Treaty would cover and in what it would be different from existing arrangements 
between the UK and the EU. 
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